Philosophy of Science

Part VIII: Conclusion – Are the Social Sciences Sciences?

A world without science would be filled with cynical, self-absorbed humans, disoriented in the social sphere. Nevertheless, naturalistic method applied to the social sciences will not be able to give full explanations of what it means to be human or the reflexive ability humans have, taking part of the scientific research in comparison to an object that does not have such a capability. Causal explanations fall flat when taking on intent, and natural selection does not cover the social forces shaping human behaviour. Naturalistic form of explaining does not cover a contextual and social dimension, and without this ability we are not able to fully understand and so cannot call it knowledge about human behavior. The concept of science must then be widened to include context and thought-processes behind actions, whereas the Aristotelian three-folded definition of science or concept of phronesis, are two of the suggested approaches.

In history, we have seen how old and new elites struggle over power, as are the naturalists in the scientific sphere, trying to hold on to their right to the concept of science. Still, this is not in favor of a powerful science, which needs creativity and challenge to stay relevant to humans and society of whom without it seizes to exist.

Philosophy of Science

Part VII: Science 2.0

All scientific knowledge is based on a process that involves certain ways of thinking about the world, being interested in the environment and sensitive to topics relevant for study. The base for social scientific inquiry is philosophical reflection on what can and should be studied, systematic procedures in data collection and tentative interpretation carefully expressed and counter-argued. A meaningful and relevant science of the 21th century needs to include context and the thought-process behind as well as experience and experiment.


An approach would be to use the Aristotelian three-folded definition of science, where naturalism would stem from a theoretical science meaning physics, metaphysics and mathematics, though missing the ethics and politics of practical science, as well as the rhetoric and art of poetical science. Aristotle’s definition allows for an epistemology where knowledge includes reasoning, context and moral: foundations for the study of human behaviour as explored above.

Adding to this is Flyvbjerg’s (2001) route which suggests that social science should look to the framework in the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, translated as practical wisdom or prudence. It goes beyond analytical knowledge, episteme, and technical know-how, techne, in that it is involved in social and political practice. Phronesis cannot be reduced to or comprehended by episteme or techne, which underwrites the weaknesses of naturalistic method applied to social sciences.


Pointing to the absurdity of using intentional explanations of physical matters is not an argument against the social sciences being sciences. There are of course limits to the disciplines and their methods, and no serious social scientist would argue against such a claim: there are no beliefs and desires by a stone on the beach, or a swing in the playing ground. But that is not an argument against the social sciences, since these objects are not the subject matter, however human action is. There are as in the natural science limits to the appropriate epistemology and method, at times overlapping and at times not. A sound science will approach every inquiry with open and analytical eyes, not with prejudgment on method and results.

However in the end, any theory of knowledge should include the element that knowledge cannot be separated from the knower, in addition to data and facts being the constructions or results of interpretation. The fact that social sciences are able to study the natural sciences, their actions and why they work in certain ways, should benefit the natural disciplines and work.


Science will always be a complex business, and today’s social science could appear more vulnerable to different interests since it is intertwined with subjective sense making. Therefor social scientists must be open to and reflect on the criticism, realizing that the naturalists make a strong case. However as seen above, when challenged with strong naturalistic arguments, the non-naturalists will need to take them on, find the problems, and formulate good reasons for why their approach still make the strongest case. In addition it would be beneficial for the naturalists not to repress the criticism on their approach to the study of human behavior. In the end, all the scrutiny of scientific method will be useful to social science, in that it will be challenged and thus continue to develop and be current, valuable and strong.